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AbstrAct
The right to a trial without undue delay is guaranteed using identical 
language in the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
statute of  the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). All 
three mirror the guarantee in the International Convention for Civil and 
Political Rights that all persons charged with crimes are entitled “to be tried 
without undue delay”. This paper will examine the reason for a right to a 
trial without undue delay and its origin in national and international law.  It 
also will show how these national guarantees serve as the basis of  the inter-
national law guarantee of  trial without undue delay and how that guarantee 
has played out in the international courts. Finally, this paper will examine 
reasons why the right of  trial without undue delay arguably has been ignored 
and/or violated in the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC due to long delays in 
completing the cases.
Keywords: Trial without undue delay. Speedy trial. International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights. International Tribunals.
resumo
O direito a um julgamento sem atrasos indevidos é garantido usando-se 
linguagem idêntica no Estatuto de Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional 
(TPI), nos estatutos do Tribunal Penal Internacional para a ex-Iugoslávia 
(TPIJ) e no Tribunal Penal Internacional para Ruanda (TPIR). Todos os 
três espelham a garantia na Convenção Internacional para os Direitos Civis 
e Políticos de que todas as pessoas acusadas de crimes têm o direito de “ser 
julgadas sem atrasos indevidos”. Esse artigo examinará a razão do direito 
a um julgamento sem demora indevida e sua origem no direito nacional 
e internacional. Também mostrará como essas garantias nacionais servem 
de base para a garantia internacional do julgamento sem atrasos indevidos 
e como essa garantia tem sido desempenhada nos tribunais internacionais. 
Finalmente, este artigo examinará as razões pelas quais o direito do julga-
mento sem demora indevida foi ignorado e / ou violado no ICTY, no ICTR 
e no ICC devido a longos atrasos na conclusão dos casos.
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Palavras-chave: Julgamento sem atraso indevido. julgamento rápido. Convenção Internacional sobre Direitos 
Civis e Políticos. Tribunais Internacionais.
1. IntroductIon
To Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza, the guarantee of  trial without undue delay must seem 
hollow.  Each was confined by the ICTR for about 14 years before being acquitted of  all charges ranging 
from genocide to rape and murder. Mugiraneza and Mugenzi were not the only ad hoc tribunal defendants 
who spent more than a decade in pretrial detention before their cases were resolved.  Theoneste Bagasora 
was in custody almost 15 years between his initial appearance at the ICTR and the decision on his appeal.1 
Joseph Kanyabash was in ICTR custody for almost 20 years before his appeal was resolved.  He served 
almost all of  a 20-year sentence in pretrial detention.
At the ICC, apparently only two cases have been to trial and appeals completed.  One defendant, Ger-
main Katanga, was arrested in October 2007. He was sentenced in May 2014.  Both the prosecution and 
Katanga dismissed their appeals the following month.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was arrested in March 2006. 
His trial ran from January 2009 through July 2012.  His 14-year sentence was affirmed on appeal in Decem-
ber 2014, more than eight years after his arrest. Joseph Kanyabash was in ICTR custody for almost 20 years 
before his appeal was resolved.  He served almost all of  a 20-year sentence in pretrial detention.
The situation was similar at the ICTY.  For example, six defendants in the Prlic case were in custody from 
2004 through 2017 – about 13 years – before their appeals were decided. Two other ICTY co-defendants, 
Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, waited from their initial appearances in June 2003 through December 
2015 – more than 12 years – for their cases to be completed.2
Former Croatian Defense Council fighter Vlatko Kupreskic, who was acquitted of  all charges, recently 
was quoted as saying he cannot fathom why he spent almost a half  decade in detention before his acquittal. 
“They never even said, sorry,” he is quoted as saying.3
At the ICC, apparently only two cases have been to trial and appeals completed.  One defendant, Ger-
main Katanga, was arrested in October 2007. He was sentenced in May 2014.  Both the prosecution and 
Katanga dismissed their appeals the following month.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was arrested in March 2006. 
His trial ran from January 2009 through July 2012.  His 14-year sentence was affirmed on appeal in Decem-
ber 2014, more than eight years after his arrest.
1 He was sentenced to 35 years incarceration.
2 These times are taken from reports of  the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia to the Security Council.  See Report of  the completion of  the mandate of  the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
as at 15 November 2015, U.N. Doc. S/2015/884 (2015) Report of  the completion of  the mandate of  the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda as at 15 November 2015, U.N. Doc. S/2015/884 (2015) and Assessment and Report of  Judge Carmel Agius, President of  the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of  Security Council 
resolution 1534 (2004), U.N. Doc. S/2017/1001 (2017). Assessment and Report of  Judge Carmel Agius, President of  the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of  Security Council resolution 1534 
(2004), U.N. Doc. S/2017/1001 (2017).  The charts in the two reports will be consolidated and included herein as Tables A and B.
3 His initial appearance at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was in January 1998.  The Appeal Cham-
ber’s judgment acquitting him was handed down October 23, 2001, three years, 10 months after his initial appearance. BALKAN 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE. War crimes convicts: hague tribunal was a ‘political court’. Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.
com/en/article/war-crimes-convicts-hague-tribunal-was-a-political-court-12-19-2017>.
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2. the rIght to speedy trIAl: Its orIgIns
2.1. Origins of the right
The right to a speedy trial or trial without undue delay at common law can be traced to Henry II and the 
Assize of  Clarendon in 1166.  It included the following guarantee of  speedy trial:
4. And when a robber or murderer or thief  or the receivers of  them be arrested through the aforesaid 
oath, if  the justices are not to come quite soon into the county where the arrests have been made, let the 
sheriffs send word by some intelligent man to one of  the nearer justices that such men have been taken; 
and the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs where they wish to have the men brought before 
them; and the sheriffs shall bring them before the justices; and also they shall bring with them from the 
hundred and the vill where the arrests have been made two lawful men to carry the record of  the county 
and hundred as to why the men were arrested, and there before the justices let them make their law.4
A half  century later, the right was enshrined in the Magna Carta as provision 40, which reads in full: “To 
no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.”5 
In 1776, the right to a speedy trial was included in the Virginia Declaration of  Rights.  It reads:
VIII That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of  
his accusation to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to 
a speedy trial by an impartial jury of  his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found 
guilty, nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of  his liberty 
except by the law of  the land or the judgement of  his peers.6
This and other guarantees in the Declaration of  Rights were influential in what eventually became the 
United States Bill of  Rights, the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  For example, Article VIII of  
the Declaration of  rights mirrors the Sixth Amendment rights to speedy trial, trial by jury, confrontation, 
the right to be informed of  the charges and the right of  compulsory process.7  It also includes the Fifth 
Amendment right against self  incrimination and the right to due process before being deprived of  liberty.8 
With minor stylistic changes, the Declaration of  Rights is almost verbatim the Eighth Amendment rights 
against excessive fines and bail and cruel and unusual punishments.9 
The right to a trial without undue delay of  course is not limited to the United States of  America.  Nu-
merous other states have found such a right.  In general, states use one of  two analyses of  the right to a 
speedy trial. Some, such as the United States, create a separate, free standing right to a speedy trial.  Others 
look at delays in trial as an adjunct to the right to a fair trial.  The difference is crucial to the determination 
of  whether the accused has been deprived of  his rights.10 
In jurisdictions in which there is no independent right to a speedy trial or to one without undue delay, 
4 Quoted by the Constitution Society.  CONSTITUTION SOCIETY. Assize of  Clarendon: 1166. Available at: <http://www.con-
stitution.org/eng/assizcla.htm>.
5 Quoted by the Constitution Society.  CONSTITUTION SOCIETY. The magna carta: the great charter. Available at: < http://
www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm>.
6 THE AVALON PROJECT DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY. Virginia declaration ofrights. Available at: 
< http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp>.
7 U.S. Constitution, Amend. VIU.S. Constitution, Amend. VI.
8 U.S. Constitution, Amend. VU.S. Constitution, Amend. V.
9 Compare, Declaration of  Rights Article IX, “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted,” with the Eighth Amendment, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” U.S. Constitution, Amend. VIIIU.S. Constitution, Amend. VIII.
10 See Sookermany v. Director of  Public Prosecutions, 1 BHRC  348 (Trinidad and Tobago Ct. App.  1996). Chief  Justice De La Bastide’s 
opinion in Sookermany contains a good discussion in the difference in treatment between states with an independent right to speedy 
trial and those common law jurisdictions in which the right to a speedy trial or a trial without undue delay is based on the individual’s 
general right to a fair trial.
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it is common to ask only whether delays caused the trial to be fundamentally unfair. In such circumstances, 
the trial court may either permanently stay the trial or instruct the jury (in some common law jurisdictions) 
as to any matter favorable to the accused due to the delay. An example is Director of  Public Prosecutions 
v. Tokai,11 case arising in Trinidad and Tobago.  In states with an independent right to speedy trial, the right 
may be violated even if  it still is possible for a defendant to get a fair trial.
2.2. States with an independent right to speedy trial
In jurisdictions with a specific right to speedy trial or trial without undue delay, the analysis normally 
centers on whether the accused has been deprived of  that right. If  so, the indictment can be dismissed or 
the trial permanently stayed. An example is P.M. v. District Judge12, where the Supreme Court of  Ireland 
permanently stayed a sexual abuse of  a child prosecution based on delays both before the formal charge 
and the between the filing of  charges and the trial itself. The Court held that even where the delay did not 
prejudice the accused’s right to fair trial, an order enjoining further prosecution was appropriate based on 
the unnecessary stress and anxiety on the accused due to the inordinate delay of  trial.
The District Court of  New Zealand used a similar analysis to permanently stay a sex abuse trial in R. v. 
Churches,13 where a trial was barred based solely on delays in the investigation caused by police inaction. In 
Martin v. Tauranga District Court,14 the High Court made it clear that the right to a speedy trial was indepen-
dent of  the right to a fair trial. Of  importance to the analysis was the High Court’s reliance on the guarantee 
of  trial without undue delay in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
guarantee imported verbatim into the ICC, ICTY and ICTR statutes.
While recognizing the interest of  society in the trial of  persons accused of  crimes, the Court’s analysis 
centered on the right of  the accused guaranteed both by New Zealand’s bill of  rights and the ICCPR.  The 
Court held that when a trial is delayed beyond the normal time for such cases to be disposed of  –  and a 
shorter time if  the accused is in custody – the prosecutor has the burden of  showing that the delays are not 
“undue delays.”  The Court also held that cases could be dismissed or trials permanently stayed based on 
what it called institutional or systemic delays, that is, delays cause by neither the accused nor the prosecution 
but inherent in the system. In determining whether institutional delay is ‘’undue,” the Court would look to 
the time periods in similar courts. Delay is not undue if  it is caused by the actions of  the accused or if  he 
waives the right. However, the prosecutor bears the burden of  proving that those delays are caused by or 
consented to by the accused. The fact that an accused fails to make a contemporaneous complaint about 
delays does not raise the presumption of  waiver.
In some jurisdictions, there is a statutory rather than constitutional right to speedy trial.  For example, 
in Scotland § 101 of  the Criminal Procedure Act of  1975 sets a 110-day limit between the time a person is 
incarcerated on a charge and the completion of  the trial. In the absence of  exceptional circumstances not 
the fault of  the prosecutor, if  the trial is not completed within 110 days of  incarceration, the accused is freed 
and the charges against him permanently dismissed. The Scottish courts apply this rule strictly. In H.M. Ad-
vocate v. McTavish,15 the High Court of  Justiciary refused to extend the time limit when the prosecutor asked 
for an extension of  time to complete laboratory testing to determine if  more serious charges could be filed 
against the accused.16
11 Director of  Public Prosecutions v. Tokai [1996] A.C. 856 (P.C.).
12 P.M. v. District Judge [2002] 2 I.R. 560.P.M. v. District Judge [2002] 2 I.R. 560. 
13 R. v. Churches, [2001) D.C.R. 581.R. v. Churches, [2001) D.C.R. 581. 
14 Martin v. Tauranga District Court [1995] 1N. Z.L.R. 491 
15 H.M. Advocate v. McTavish,[1974] SLT 246 
16 The McTavish Court applied a predecessor statute, § 43 of  the Criminal Procedure Actm (Scotland) 1887. It is effectively 
identical to the current statute.
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2.3. The Right as Part of a Fair Trial Guarantee
In jurisdictions in which there is no independent right to a speedy trial or one without undue delay, it is 
common to ask only whether delays caused the trial to be fundamentally unfair. In such circumstances, the 
trial court may either permanently stay the trial or instruct the jury (in some common law jurisdictions) as 
to any matter favorable to the accused due to the delay. An example is Director of  Public Prosecutions v. Tokai, a 
case arising in Trinidad and Tobago. In South Africa the right to a speedy trial is one of  a number of  rights 
associated with fair trials.17  In South Africa the legal analysis is a balancing of  the interests of  the accused 
and of  society. Overall, states analyzing speedy trial as an adjunct to a fair trial require a showing that a trial 
would be fundamentally unfair in order to trigger relief  due to denial of  a speedy trial.
The Scottish High Court of  the Justiciary explained the analysis as follows:
The right to a trial within a reasonable time figures in many constitutions and declarations of  rights. 
Frequently, as in art 6 [of  the European Convention on Human Rights], it figures alongside rights to a 
fair trial and an independent tribunal. However, the right to a trial within a reasonable time is a right of  
a somewhat different character from the other two rights, for the reasons explained by Justice Powell 
in his frequently quoted opinion in Barker v Wingo. Justice Powell observed that the right to a speedy 
trial is generically different from any other rights enshrined in the United States Constitution for the 
protection of  the accused. He pointed out, first, that there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial 
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to the interests of  the accused: and secondly that 
deprivation of  the right could work to the accused’s advantage and did not per se prejudice the accused’s 
ability to defend himself. He continued: “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the right to speedy trial 
is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with 
precision when the right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system 
where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point in the 
criminal process when the State can put the defendant to the choice of  either exercising or waiving the 
right to a speedy trial … Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v Haubert, any inquiry into a speedy trial 
claim necessitates a functional analysis of  the right in the particular context of  the case: … ‘The right 
of  a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It 
secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of  public justice’. The amorphous quality 
of  the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of  dismissal of  the indictment when the 
right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who 
may be guilty of  a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious 
than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy. 
The view that discontinuance of  the prosecution is the only possible remedy is, as I understand the 
position, derived from the particular provisions of  the United States Constitution and is not necessarily 
to be taken as a general observation to be applied in relation to other constitutional instruments or 
declarations of  rights. Justice Powell continued by discussing the appropriate approach to determining 
whether the right had been infringed. He rejected some suggested rigid rules and favoured a balancing 
test in which the conduct of  both the prosecution and the defendant should be weighed. For the present 
purpose, I do not think that it is necessary to repeat what was said about the considerations which may 
be relevant in applying the test.
There are thus two features of  the right to trial within a reasonable time which may lead to difficulties 
and sometimes to unsatisfactory results in attempting to apply it, namely (1) that it is impossible to 
specify precisely what is a reasonable time and (2) that if  the only remedy for a breach of  the right is 
discontinuance of  the prosecution, that may be unsatisfactorily severe from the public point of  view. 
The difficulties are illustrated by the three, again very well known, decisions of  the Judicial Committee 
of  the Privy Council in Bell v DPP of  Jamaica, Darmalingum v The State and Flowers v The 
Queen. In Darmalingum, it was held that the only possible remedy, on the terms of  the particular 
constitutional instrument involved and all the facts of  the case, was discontinuance of  the prosecution. 
In Bell and in Flowers, a different result was reached. I do not think that it would really be helpful for 
the present purpose to attempt to analyse either the facts or the speeches in these cases in detail. There 
17 Sanderson v. Attorney General, 3 BKRC 647 (S.A. Const. Ct. 1997) 
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is, I think, no doubt that if  there has been such delay as to cause material prejudice to the fairness of  
any trial, the prosecution cannot proceed. Similarly, there would, I suppose, be no dispute that there may 
be cases in which delay has been so prolonged that it would be outrageous to allow criminal charges 
to proceed and discontinuance is the only remedy which can reasonably be regarded as appropriate, 
whatever general approach is being applied. Darmalingum might perhaps be regarded as a case of  
that kind. As regards the other two decisions, it is, in my view, sufficient to note that different results 
may easily be seen to be appropriate in different circumstances. What Justice Powell described as the 
“slippery character” of  the right is also illustrated by the decision of  the New Zealand Court of  Appeal 
in Martin v Tauranga District Council in which a variety of  opinions were expressed about the 
appropriate remedy, although it can perhaps be said that the majority tended to favour the view that 
discontinuance was not the only remedy for a breach.18
In that case, Lord Coulsfield was construing the application of  the guarantee in Article 6 (1) of  the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights and how they are applied to Scotland under legislation adopting the 
convention as national law.19 
The House of  Lords, like the Scottish court, views the right to a speedy trial under the convention and 
United Kingdom law as part of  a package of  fair trial rights.  Deprivation of  the right to a speedy trial does 
not necessarily result in the deprivation of  a fair trial.  The House of  Lords wrote:
[T]here is a right to a fair and public hearing; a right to a hearing within a reasonable time; a right to a 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law; and (less often referred to) a right 
to the public pronouncement of  judgment. It does not follow that the consequences of  a breach, or a 
threatened or prospective breach, of  each of  these rights is necessarily the same. 
It is accepted as “axiomatic” that a person charged with having committed a criminal offence should 
receive a fair trial and that, if  he cannot be tried fairly for that offence, he should not be tried for it at 
all”.
In such a case the court must stay the proceedings. But this will not be the appropriate course if  
the apprehended unfairness can be cured by exercise of  the trial judge’s discretion within the trial 
process. Neither of  these cases was based on the Convention, but neither is in any way discordant with 
the Convention jurisprudence. If  it is established, after the event, that a trial was unfair, any resulting 
conviction will be quashed. This is what domestic law requires, and what the Convention requires.20
2.4. The United States of America
The United States’ constitutional guarantee of  a speedy trial differs from other states in several impor-
tant ways, the most important being that it centers on the period between indictment or arrest and convic-
tion.  There is no U.S. right of  a speedy appeal as is common in other jurisdictions.
The leading U.S. case on speedy trial is Barker v. Wingo.21  Barker is notable for several reasons.  First, it 
uses a balancing test to lay the blame for the delay on the prosecution or the defendant.  Second, it recog-
nizes that dismissal of  charges is the only possible remedy for a deprivation of  the right.  Third, the Court 
listed the major reasons for the right to a speedy trial. The Court identified three interests protected by the 
right to a speedy trial:
(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of  the accused; 
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.  Of  these, the most serious is the last, 
because the inability of  a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of  the entire 
18 HM Advocate v. R [2002] S.L.T. 834HM Advocate v. R [2002] S.L.T. 834, 837-38 (internal citations omitted).
19 The article reads in relevant part: “In the determination of  his civil rights and obligations or of  any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
20 Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of  2001) [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 25Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of  2001) [2004] 1 Cr. App. 
R. 25, paras. 13-14 (H.L.) (internal citations omitted).
21 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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system. If  witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if  
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of  the distant past. Loss of  memory, however, is 
not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.22
The Court rejected both a set time period in which a trial must commence and that the defendant 
demand a speedy trial.23  Instead, the Court set four factors to be balanced to determine if  a defendant’s 
right to speedy trial was violated: 1) length of  the delay;24 2) the reasons the government gives to justify the 
delay;25 3) the defendant’s assertion of  the right to speedy trial;26 and 4) prejudice to the defendant.27
Generally, a delay approaching a year is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial claim and prejudice is presu-
med, Doggett v. United States.28  The longer the delay, the greater the presumption of  prejudice.  Id.  And, while 
the right to speedy trial does not accrue until a person is arrested or indicted, United States v. McDonald,29 the 
government has a duty to arrest the defendant and bring him to trial once he is indicted or charged.  United 
States v. Cardona.30  So, if  the government holds back on arresting the defendant to gain a tactical advantage, 
the pre-arrest delay weighs heavily against the government.  Conversely, if  the defendant is actively hiding 
and evading arrest, the delay weighs heavily against the defendant. 
One factor especially relevant to trials before the ICC, the ICTY and ICTR is the availability of  resour-
ces for the prosecution to try the accused.  As will be shown, infra, the tribunals had significant shortfalls in 
resources such as courtroom space and the number of  available judges.
In Strunk v. United States31 and Barker v. Wingo, the Court held lack of  resources – in Strunk, appropriations 
to hire sufficient prosecutors – was a factor weighing against the government. In Barker v. Wingo, the Court 
wrote:
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but 
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 
with the government rather than with the defendant.32
The Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial centers on protecting the defendant from the prejudices and 
harms set out in Barker v. Wingo.  A person may be entitled to a dismissal for violation of  the Sixth Amen-
dment right to speedy trial even though he could still receive a fair trial.  This is the opposite of  the view in 
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom.
Additionally, the Barker v. Wingo analysis does not consider the interests of  the government and the 
public in having criminal charges decided following a full trial. Stated simply, the Speedy Trial Clause of  
the Sixth Amendment can result in the freeing of  a factually guilty person simply due to delay.  A perfect 
example is Cardona.  He was convicted of  a drug conspiracy following a jury trial33 yet in considering his 
appeal based on denial of  speedy trial, the United States Court of  Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
based on his demand for a speedy trial after an unexplained five-year delay between indictment and arrest,34 
22 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 532. 
23 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 529-30.
24 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 530-31. 
25 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 531.
26 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 531-32.
27 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), at 532.
28 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
29 United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982).
30 United States v. Cardona, 302 F., 3d 494 (5th Cir. 2002).
31 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) 
32 Strunk, 407 U.S., at 531.
33 Cardona, 302 F.3d, at 496.
34 The government filed a memorandum detailing its attempts to arrest Cardona but, in the words of  the Fifth Circuit, “did not 
support its memorandum with a shred of  evidence either then or at the later hearing.”  Cardona, 302 F.3d, at 497.  If  the government 
had shown diligence in attempting to arrest him, Cardona would have do shown actual prejudice rather than relying on a presump-
tion. Cardona, 302 F.3d, at 497.
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the government had the burden of  showing a lack of  prejudice.35
While Cardona is an outlier due to the government’s failure to present apparently available evidence of  
attempts to arrest Cardona, it is an example of  how the U.S. right to speedy trial can benefit a defendant 
who did not show he was actually prejudiced even by lengthy pretrial incarceration.36 His guilt or innocence 
was not a factor in the appellate court’s analysis and in fact was mentioned only when the opinion stated he 
was convicted after a jury trial.
3. non-trIbunAl InternAtIonAl jurIsprudence
In this section, I will review jurisprudence from the two major and influential international bodies pro-
tecting human rights, the Human Rights Committee of  the United Nations and the European Court of  
Human Rights. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted an optional protocol to the ICCPR 
establishing a Human Rights Committee to evaluate violations of  the convention raised by individuals.  The 
protocol went into effect in 1976.37
3.1. The human rights committee
The Human Rights Committee sets out its interpretation of  the right of  the convention in two ways. 
First, it issues “General Comments” on a variety of  topics related to the ICCPR.  Second, it decides indivi-
dual cases.
3.1.1. General comment 32 and speedy trial
General Comment 32 gives the committee’s views on Article 14 of  the ICCPR’s guarantees of  fair trial38 
and the right to equality before the courts.39  The comment first notes Article 14 contains “guarantees that 
States parties must respect, regardless of  their legal traditions and their domestic law.”40  The general com-
ment discusses the right to trial without undue delay in a single paragraph, which reads:
35 Cardona, 302 F.3d, at 499.
36 Cardona was indicted on April 23, 1995, but not arrested until October 28, 2000. He moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on 
January 28, 2001. Id., at 496. His conviction was vacated and the indictment ordered dismissed by the Fifth Circuit on August 16, 2002.
37 Numerous states, including at least three permanent members of  the U.N. Security Council, have not ratified the protocol. 
Non-party states include the United States, the United Kingdom, China, India, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.  State parties to the 
optional protocol include Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Republic of  Korea and the Russian Federation. See <https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en>.
38 Article 14(3) of  the Convention contains defendants’ fair trial rights.  It reads in full: “In the determination of  any criminal 
charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of  the nature and cause of  the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of  his defence and to communicate with counsel of  his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself  in person or through legal assistance of  his own choosing; to be informed, if  
he does not have legal assistance, of  this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of  justice 
so require, and without payment by him in any such case if  he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of  witnesses on his 
behalf  under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of  an interpreter if  he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself  or to confess guilt.
This section of  the ICCPR was incorporated verbatim into the statues of  the ICTY and ICTR.
39 General Comment No. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007)
40 General Comment No. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 4.
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The right of  the accused to be tried without undue delay, provided for by article 14, paragraph 3 (c), 
is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too long in a state of  uncertainty about their fate and, 
if  held in detention during the period of  the trial, to ensure that such deprivation of  liberty does not 
last longer than necessary in the circumstances of  the specific case, but also to serve the interests of  
justice. What is reasonable has to be assessed in the circumstances of  each case, taking into account 
mainly the complexity of  the case, the conduct of  the accused and the manner in which it was dealt with 
by the administrative and judicial authorities.  In cases where the accused are denied bail by the court, 
they must be tried as expeditiously as possible.  This guarantee relates not only to the time between the 
formal charging of  the accused and the time by which trial should commence, but also the time until the 
final judgment on appeal.  All stages, whether in the first instance or on appeal must take place without 
“undue delay.”41
It is noteworthy that the committee, charged with interpreting the ICCPR, interprets the guarantee of  
trial without undue delay to include not only the time between initiation of  charges through commencement 
of  the trial but the entire process including trial, deliberations on verdict and appeal.  This is contrary to the 
practice in the United States, limiting the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial to the period between arrest 
or initiation of  formal proceedings through conviction.42
3.1.2. The committee’s case law
The committee strictly enforces the Article 14(3) (c) guarantee of  trial without undue delay even in view 
of  the governments’ claims that lengthy investigations were required or that the government lacked the re-
sources to provide a speedier trial or appeal.  Additionally, once it is determined that the delay was excessive, 
the burden is on the government to show an acceptable reason for the delay.
An example is Agudo v. Spain.43  Agudo was accused of  a series of  fraudulent bank transactions from 
1971-83.  Charges were initiated in 1983 and the trial judgment sentencing him to two years incarceration 
was delivered in 1994.44  He was ordered incarcerated on the sentence in 1999, following appeal and a re-
quest for pardon.45  He claimed the proceeding which lasted more than 15 years violated his right to a trial 
without undue delay.46
The committee granted Agudo relief.  It held the Spanish government conceded the delay of  11 years 
through trial and 13 years through the appeal violated Agudo’s rights under the ICCPR and that the go-
vernment did not give an explanation for the delay.47  It further held the government had an obligation to 
provide an effective remedy for denial of  trial without undue delay, including compensation, and to ensure 
that defendants did not have to initiate a separate action to obtain compensation.48
Likewise, in Hendricks v. Guyana,49 the committee found a violation in part due to the government’s failu-
re to explain a three-year delay between arrest and trial in a triple murder case in which the defendant was 
sentenced to death.50  In a similar case, Flipovich v. Lithuania,51 the committee found for a defendant charged 
with murder based on a four-year, three month investigation in a murder case.52
41 General Comment No. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 35 (internal citations omitted).
42 Betterman v. Montana, U.S. 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016)
43 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002) 
44 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002), para. 2.3.
45 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002), para. 2.09-2.10.
46 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002), para. 3.2.
47 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002), para. 9.1.
48 Agudo v. Spain, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002), para. 11.
49 Hendricks v. Guyana, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/893/1998 (2002) 
50 Hendricks v. Guyana, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/893/1998 (2002), para. 6.3.
51 Flipovich v. Lithuania, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/875/1999 (2003)
52 The offense was committed in September 1991 and the trial judgment delivered in January 1996.  Flipovich v. Lithuania, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/875/1999 (2003), para. 7.1.
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The Committee also takes note of  the fact that the State party has not given any explanation of  the 
reason why four years and four months elapsed between the start of  the investigation and the conviction 
in first instance. Considering that the investigation ended, according to the information available to 
the Committee, following the report by the forensic medical commission and that the case was not 
so complex as to justify a delay of  four years and four months, or three years and 2 months after the 
preparation of  the forensic medical report, the Committee concludes that there was a violation of  
article 14, paragraph 3 (c).53
The committee applies the same failure to present proof  of  an excuse to delays in the appellate process. 
In Mwamba v. Zambia,54 the committee considered a complaint of  undue appellate delay in a case involving 
a former high-ranking police officer sentenced to death for the murder of  a truck driver and theft 40 tons 
of  copper cathodes.  The offense occurred on March 24, 1999.55  His trial began on September 1, 1999, and 
he was convicted on August 8, 2001.56  He complained of  a five-year delay in his appeal.57  The government 
told the committee on February 9, 2007, that the appeal had yet to be heard due to “technical reasons” in 
that a verbatim transcript of  the trial had not been typed.58  The committee held:
The Committee notes that the State party’s only response to date to the author’s allegations is that the 
appeal has not yet taken place “due to technical reasons” and it has provided no arguments on the 
substance of  the author’s claims. It reaffirms that the burden of  proof  cannot rest on the author of  
the communication alone, especially considering that the author and the State party do not always have 
equal access to the evidence and frequently the State party alone has the relevant information. It is 
implicit in article 4, paragraph 2 of  the Optional Protocol that the State party has the duty to investigate 
in good faith all allegations of  violations of  the Covenant made against it and its representatives and to 
furnish to the Committee the information available to it.  In the light of  the failure of  the State party 
to cooperate with the Committee on the matter before it, due weight must be given to the author’s 
allegations, to the extent that they have been substantiated.59
The committee ordered Zambia to afford Mwamba an unspecified relief  including a review of  his 
conviction and adequate reparations, including compensation.60 However, a review of  two cases from New 
Zealand shows the committee will find no violation of  the convention if  a state gives a reasonable explana-
tion for the delay. In Dean v. New Zealand,61 the committee reviewed a claim of  undue appellate delay lodged 
by a man with a 40-year record of  indecency convictions jailed indefinitely for fondling a 13-year-old boy in 
a movie theater. The offense occurred on June 24, 1995.62  He pled guilty in district court, where she faced 
a maximum punishment of  three years incarceration, but the judge transferred the case to the high court 
where he was liable for indefinite preventive detention.  On November 3, 1995, the high court sentenced 
him to indefinite detention with a 10-year minimum sentence before parole.63
The initial appeal – where he was not represented by counsel – was denied on November 23, 1995. 
However, in subsequent appeals to the Privy Council and the Court of  Appeals, the initial appeal was found 
flawed.  He was granted appointed council and the Court of  Appeal denied the subsequent appeal on De-
cember 17, 2004.  The Supreme Court denied review on April 11, 2005.64  He complained to the committee 
53 As is the committee’s practice, it ordered the government to provide the defendant with an effective but unspecified remedy (in-
cluding compensation) and to ensure that future violations do not occur.  Flipovich v. Lithuania, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/875/1999 
(2003), para. 10.
54 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010)
55 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 2.1.
56 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 2.3.
57 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 3.5.
58 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 4.
59 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 6.2.
60 Mwamba v. Zambia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010), para. 8.
61 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009) 
62 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009), para. 2.1.
63 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009), para. 2.3.
64 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009), para. 2.4.
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that the appropriate remedy for the nine-year appellate delay was reduction of  sentence from indefinite 
preventive detention to a finite term.65
The government, however explained the delays.  According to the committee,
The State party submits that the length of  time taken in rehearing the author’s appeal does not amount 
to a breach of  article 14, and that even if  it did, a reduction in sentence would not be an appropriate 
remedy as there was no harm to the author arising from the delay, and the rehearing of  his appeal 
constituted a remedy for the flawed procedure followed in the determination of  the author’s first appeal. 
The State party submits that the initial appeal was heard and determined within reasonable time, on 21 
March 1996. The author did not challenge the procedure by which his appeal was determined. After 
other appellants had challenged the procedure and as a result of  consequent legislative amendments, 
the author was provided with an opportunity for a rehearing. He filed an application for a rehearing on 
21 May 2003. The rehearing took place on 10 November and 15 December 2004. As admitted by the 
author, 12 months of  that delay was due to unavailability of  counsel. The State party therefore submits 
that the delay of  seven years and three months in the determination of  the author’s appeal cannot be 
solely attributed to the State party.66
The committee accepted the government’s explanation for the delay because it was backed up with facts. 
It wrote:
The author has claimed that he is a victim of  undue delay in the hearing of  his appeal. The Committee 
notes that initially the author’s appeal was heard in 1996, but that in 2002 a Privy Council and Court of  
Appeal judgement considered flawed the procedure applied in the hearing of  the appeal. Subsequently 
the author was given an opportunity to apply for a rehearing of  his appeal, which he did on 21 May 
2003. The Court of  Appeal rejected his appeal on 17 December 2004. In the specific circumstances of  
the case, the Committee considers that the delay in determining the author’s appeal does not amount to 
a violation of  article 14, paragraphs 3(c) and 5.67
Similarly, in Jessop v. New Zealand,68 the case of  a 15-year-old girl sentenced to four years incarceration 
for aggravated robbery, the committee found no violation of  the right to trial without undue delay during a 
nine-year period between arrest and final appellate decision when the government accounted for the delays 
in detail.  Jessop included a complex series of  decisions, including transfer of  the case from Youth Court to 
the High Court and numerous appeals.  Further, the committee laid much of  the blame for the appellate 
delay on Jessop and her attorney – who was out of  the country and unavailable for two years, nine months 
of  the appellate process.69  She also was held responsible for considerable delays in rehearing of  her case by 
the Court of  Appeal after remand from the Privy Council and delay in seeking rehearing after the Supreme 
Court denied review.70
A significant factor in Jessop was the committee’s lack of  analysis.  It simply held, “The issue of  delay must 
be assessed against the overall circumstances of  the case, including an assessment of  the factual and legal 
complexity of  the case,”71  then without further analysis, decided, 
“In the specific circumstances of  the case, the Committee considers that the delay in determining the 
author’s appeal does not amount to a violation of  article 14, paragraphs 3(c), paragraph 4 or paragraph 
5 of  the Covenant.”72
3.2. The European Court of Human Rights
65 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009), para. 3.4.
66 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009) para. 4.6.
67 Dean v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/151/1512/2006 (2009), para. 7.2.
68 Jessop v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1758/2008 (2011) 
69 Jessop v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1758/2008 (2011), para. 8.4.
70 Jessop v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1758/2008 (2011), paras. 8.3-8.5.
71 Jessop v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1758/2008 (2011), para. 8.2.
72 Jessop v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1758/2008 (2011), para. 8.5.
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The basic document containing the rights enforced by the ECHR is the European the general rights set 
out in Article 6(1).  The relevant part is:
In the determination of  his civil rights and obligations or of  any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.
The language of  the ECHR, unlike the ICCPR, does not grant a specific guarantee of  speedy trial or trial 
without undue delay.  Rather, the “fair and public hearing” must be within a “reasonable time.”  It follows 
that the right to hearing within a reasonable time is part of  the general fair trial rights rather than a specific 
free-standing guarantee.  It is not included in the guarantees for criminal defendants in Article 6 (3) of  the 
convention.73
Like the Human Rights Committee, the ECHR publishes a handbook on the rights of  defendants gua-
ranteed by the convention, Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial 
(Criminal Limb).74 I will examine both the guide and case law separately.
3.2.1. The guide on article 6
Reasonable time for a hearing begins when charges are preferred.75  When it ends is less definite.  It 
continues through the final determination of  guilt or innocence, even if  the determination is by an appellate 
court76 and at least until the sentence is definitely fixed.77
Factors to be considered in determining if  the time for the proceeding is based on an overall evaluation 
of  the proceeding.  Thus, a “reasonable time” may be exceeded even if  some stages of  the proceeding are 
completed with acceptable speed and some not.78  The ECHR looks to the complexity of  the case, the 
defendant’s conduct and the conduct of  applicable administrative and judicial officials in determining whe-
ther the proceedings were within a reasonable time.79
Complexity is determined using numerous factors including the number of  counts, the number of  
accused and witnesses, the international dimensions of  the case such as the need to investigate in several 
countries and the type of  case.  The guide uses as an example “white collar” cases of  large scale fraud invol-
ving numerous companies and complex transactions designed to hide fraud.80  Even in complex cases, long 
periods of  unexplained inactivity by the authorities generally are not considered reasonable.81
In reviewing the defendants’ conduct, the court does not require them to cooperate with the authorities 
and they may take advantage of  national criminal procedure resulting in delays.  However, their conduct is a 
73 Article 6(3) lists the following specific guarantees for defendants:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of  the nature and cause of  the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of  his defense;
(c) to defend himself  in person or through legal assistance of  his own choosing or, if  he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of  justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of  witnesses on his behalf  
under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of  an interpreter if  he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.
74 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb) Hereinafter “the guide.”  The 
English version is available on the internet at <http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf>.  Ver-
sions are available in numerous other languages on the court’s website. 
75 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 182.
76 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 186.
77 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 187.
78 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 189.
79 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 191.
80 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 192.
81 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 193.
CL
IN
E
, C
yn
th
ia
. T
ri
al
 w
it
h
o
ut
 u
n
du
e 
de
la
y:
 a
 p
ro
m
is
e 
un
fu
lfi
lle
d 
in
 in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 c
ri
m
in
al
 c
o
ur
ts
. R
ev
. B
ra
s.
 P
o
lít
. P
úb
lic
as
, B
ra
sí
lia
, v
. 8
, n
º 
1,
 2
01
8 
p.
54
-8
8
67
fact which is taken into consideration in determining if  the overall time is reasonable.82
The authorities have a duty to design the judicial system to meet its requirements.  Heavy workload and 
measures to redress them are rarely given decisive weight by the court.  If  an accused is in pretrial detention, 
the court finds protracted periods of  inactivity unacceptable.83
3.2.2. ECHR jurisprudence
Like the Human Rights Committee, the ECHR looks for reasonable explanations of  delays from the 
authorities and, in their absence, will find that delays were unreasonable.  For example, in Bozkaya v. Turkey,84 
the court simply repeated the mantra, 
“The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of  the length of  proceedings must be assessed in the light 
of  the circumstances of  the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of  the case, 
the conduct of  the applicants and the relevant authorities,”85
then found a five and one half  year delay between arrest and the end of  the appellate process was unreaso-
nable.  Of  importance to the court’s decision were unexplained delays of  10 months and two years while 
the case was on appeal.86
The converse of  Bozkaya is Wemhoff  v. Germany.87  In that case, involving a bank fraud, in which the de-
fendant was arrested on November 9, 1961, and was indicted on July 7, 1964.  He was convicted on April 7, 
1965, and sentenced to six years, six months incarceration.  His pretrial detention was credited to his senten-
ce.  His appeal was denied on December 17, 1965, and he was released on October 20, 1966, after serving 
two-thirds of  his sentence.  The court relied on evidence from the German government that the case was 
handled expeditiously and held:
The Court therefore, having found no failure on the part of  the judicial authorities in their duty of  
particular diligence under that provision, must a fortiori accept that there has been no contravention of  
the obligation contained in Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) of  the Convention. Even if  the length of  the review 
proceedings (Revision) is to be taken into account, it certainly did not exceed the reasonable limit.88
4. the themes of non-trIbunAl jurIsprudence
Lord Coulsfield’s view of  Justice Powell’s description of  the right to speedy trial as “slippery”89 is how 
the courts and the committee construe and apply the right to trial without undue delay or speedy trial.  There 
are no fixed limits and no solid criteria to determine if  the right has been violated.  Rather, it is similar to 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of  obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”90  However, 
some themes run through the case law.
82 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), para. 194.
83 Guide on Article 6 of  the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), paras. 198-99.
84 Bozkaya v. Turkey, No. 46661/09, ECHR 2017, <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-57595”]}>.  In citing ECHR 
cases, this paper uses the citation form recommended by the Court and includes the internet address for the decision.
85 Bozkaya v. Turkey, No. 46661/09, ECHR 2017, para. 59.
86 Bozkaya v. Turkey, No. 46661/09, ECHR 2017, para. 60.  The court found that its finding of  violations of  the ECHR was 
sufficient “just satisfaction” for the defendant, especially in view of  his right to request a new trial.  It awarded him 2,000 Euros as 
compensation for non-pecuniary damages (paras. 69-70).
87 Wemhoff  v. Germany, No. 2122/64, ECHR 1968, <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“appno”: [“2122/64”],”item-
id”:[“001-57595”]}>. 
88 Wemhoff  v. Germany, No. 2122/64, ECHR 1968, para. 20.
89 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S., at 523.
90 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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First, if  the delay appears to be long, courts likely will find no violation of  the right if  the authorities ac-
ted expeditiously.  However, in the absence of  proof  offered by the authorities to explain delays, a violation 
is more likely to be found. Second, a systemic lack of  resources likely will be held against the government 
and relief  is more likely to be granted. Third, if  a defendant attempts to “game” the system by using pro-
cedural means to delay the proceeding, the claim is more likely to fail.  This also is true if  the defendant 
actively evades arrest.
Fourth, the complexity of  the case matters.  The more defendants, the more witnesses, the more char-
ges, the more evidence, the more likely that long periods between arrest and resolution will be accepted as 
reasonable. Fifth, the authorities have to act reasonably and diligently to bring the case to resolution.  Ne-
gligence or delay to gain advantages by the government makes it more likely a violation will be found. Sixth, 
prejudice to the defendant ranging from excessive pretrial detention to loss of  witnesses makes a finding of  
violation more likely.
Seventh, while the courts rarely discuss it, society as a whole has an interest in trials without undue delay 
under the theory that justice delayed is justice denied. Eighth, the remedy is unclear.  As the House of  Lords 
held in Attorney General’s Reference No. 2, if  a person cannot be tried fairly, he should not be tried at all but that 
judges often can fashion remedies to protect defendants whose trials have been unreasonably delayed.  On 
the other hand, some states such as the United States hold the sole remedy is dismissal of  charges.
Ninth and most important, the courts either explicitly or implicitly use balancing tests.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court and the European Court of  Human rights are explicit in the factors used in their balancing factors 
while other courts are less so.  However, as in all balancing tests, there is substantial room for the judge to 
“balance” the factors in such a way that the tribunal gets the outcome it wants.
5. the Icty/Ictr/Icc And speedy trIAl
5.1. The ad hoc tribunals
The leading case – and the most hotly litigated case – on trial without undue delay at the ad hoc tribunals, 
the ICTY and the ICTR, involved Prosper Mugurineza, the former minister of  civil service in Rwanda.  It 
is the leading example how the ad hoc tribunals handled complaints of  violation of  the right to trial without 
undue delay.
Prior to the trial and after being incarcerated without bond for four years, Mugiraneza asked the Trial 
Chamber to dismiss the indictment against him.91  The Trial Chamber denied relief, holding it had to balance 
Mugiraneza’s rights against the fundamental purpose of  the Tribunal, prosecuting those responsible for the 
Rwandan genocide.92  The Trial Chamber held that Mugiraneza’s rights under the statute had to be balanced 
with the need to ascertain the truth of  the offenses with which he was charged.93
On interlocutory appeal, the Appeals Chamber vacated the Trial Chamber decision and adopted a five-
-prong test to determine whether the right to trial without undue delay was violated.  The factors are:
91 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-I, Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of  Article 
20(c)(4) of  the Statute, Demand for Speedy Trial and for Appropriate Relief  (17 July 2003).
92 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-I, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation 
of  Article 20(4)(c) of  the Statute, Demand for Speedy Trial and Appropriate Relief  (3 October 2003), para. 11.
93 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-I, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation 
of  Article 20(4)(c) of  the Statute, Demand for Speedy Trial and Appropriate Relief  (3 October 2003), para. 12.
CL
IN
E
, C
yn
th
ia
. T
ri
al
 w
it
h
o
ut
 u
n
du
e 
de
la
y:
 a
 p
ro
m
is
e 
un
fu
lfi
lle
d 
in
 in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 c
ri
m
in
al
 c
o
ur
ts
. R
ev
. B
ra
s.
 P
o
lít
. P
úb
lic
as
, B
ra
sí
lia
, v
. 8
, n
º 
1,
 2
01
8 
p.
54
-8
8
69
1. The length of  the delay.
2. The complexity of  the proceedings, such as the number of  charges, the number of  accused, the num-
ber of  witnesses, the volume of  evidence, the complexity of  law and fact.
3. he conduct of  the parties.
4. The conduct of  the relevant authorities.
5. The prejudice to the accused, if  any.94
In effect, the Appeals Chamber adopted the Barker v. Wingo analysis with the addition of  consideration 
of  complexity of  the case. The Appeals Chamber specifically disapproved the Trial Chamber’s holding that 
there was no need to inquire into the actions of  the Prosecutor.95 It also disapproved using the “fundamental 
purpose” of  the Tribunal – prosecuting those responsible for the 1994 genocide – as a factor in the equa-
tion.96
Mugiraneza is the leading case at the ICTY and ICTR for determining whether a defendant was deprived 
of  his right to trial without undue delay.  As will be shown, many ICTR trials and appeals involved defen-
dants in pretrial confinement for years.  Apparently no ICTR defendant was granted pretrial release.97  The 
ICTY granted provisional release to several defendants but required them to return to custody during trial.
Of  importance to the Tribunals’ jurisprudence on trial without undue delay, the Mugiraneza Trial Cham-
ber on remand continued to balance the right of  trial without undue delay with the purpose of  the Tribunal. 
It wrote: 
[T]he Trial Chamber must also be vigilant to ensure that the right to a trial without undue delay is ba-
lanced with the need to ascertain the truth about the serious crimes with which the Accused is charged.98
The Bizimungu trial (also known as Government II) began November 6, 2003, about four and a half  years 
after the accused were arrested in April 1999. The prosecution presented 57 witnesses over 178 trial days.99 
The defense case for all four defendants began November 1, 2005, and ended June 12, 2008.  The four 
defendants presented a total of  114 witnesses over 221 trial days.100  The Trial Chamber judgment was an-
nounced on September 30, 2011, and issued in written form on October 19, 2011.101
In both the Trial Chamber judgment and the Appeal Chamber judgment, there were partially dissenting 
opinions on denial of  the right to trial without undue delay.  Both centered on the delay between the end 
of  the trial and the Trial Chamber judgment.  In the Trial Chamber, Judge Short found violation based on 
administrative problems and delays caused by the Tribunal, including assigning the other judges to other 
cases.  He would have reduced the sentences of  Mugiraneza and co-defendant Justin Mugenzi from 30 years 
94 Prosecutor v. Mugiraneza, No. ICTR-99-50-AR73, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Chamber 
II Decision of  2 October 2003 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Demand for Speedy Trial and Appropriate Relief  
(27 February 2004), at 3.
95 Prosecutor v. Mugiraneza, No. ICTR-99-50-AR73, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Cham-
ber II Decision of  2 October 2003 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Demand for Speedy Trial and Appropriate 
Relief  (27 February 2004),
96 Prosecutor v. Mugiraneza, No. ICTR-99-50-AR73, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Interlocutory Appeal from Trial Cham-
ber II Decision of  2 October 2003 Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Demand for Speedy Trial and Appropriate 
Relief  (27 February 2004).
97 Until May 2003, the ICTR Rules of  Procedure and Evidence made provisional release “exceptional.”  This is the reverse of  
Article 9(3) of  the ICCPR which makes provisional release pretrial the standard.
98 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Application for a Hearing or other Relief  on His 
Motion for Dismissal for Violation of  His Right to Trial Without Undue Delay (3 November 2004), para. 32.  The Trial Chamber 
denied leave to file an interlocutory appeal of  that decision.  Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugi-
raneza’s Motion for Leave to Appeal From the Trial Chamber’s Decision of  3 November 2004 (24 February 2005).
99 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment (30 September 2011), Annex A Procedural History, para. 29.
100 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment (30 September 2011), Annex A Procedural History, para. 81.
101 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment (30 September 2011), Annex A Procedural History, para. 161.
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to 25 years on the counts on which they were convicted.102  In the Appeals Chamber, the claims of  violation 
of  the right to trial without undue delay were dismissed by the majority. Both defendants were acquitted on 
the two counts of  conviction based on insufficiency of  the evidence.103  Judge Robinson agreed with Judge 
Short’s analysis of  the excessive time writing the trial judgment.  He would have granted Mugiraneza and 
Mugenzi both $5,000 as compensation.104
In a decision handed down about two years later in the Butare case,105 a similarly constituted Appeals 
Chamber – including Judge Khan, the presiding judge from the Government II trial – found a violation of  
the right to trial without undue delay based on arguments similar to those raised on appeal in Government II. 
The Butare case differed from Government II in two important respects.  First, the Appeals Chamber affir-
med convictions as to all six Butare defendants while both Government II appellants were acquitted on appeal 
due to insufficiency of  the evidence.106  The second is the length of  trial and pre-trial confinement.  The 
Butare defendants had been in custody for varying periods beginning in 1995 and the trial did not commence 
until December 2001.  It ended in December 2008 after 714 trial days.  By the time the Butare appeal judg-
ment was delivered, one of  the defendants had been in custody almost 21 years.107
The Butare Appeals Chamber centered its analysis on two major factors: delays caused by the prosecu-
tion, especially delays in discovery; and delays caused by the assignment of  the Butare judges to other cases 
during the Butare.  As to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose documents to the defense, the Appeals Chamber 
wrote:
Although the Prosecution acknowledged its lack of  readiness and belatedness in fulfilling its disclosure 
obligations, upon which the start of  the trial depended, it does not provide any explanation as to why 
it was not in a position to disclose some of  the relevant materials despite express orders from the Trial 
Chamber or why it repeatedly changed the date for its readiness to commence trial. While the trial 
was postponed by one month as a result of  the death of  Judge Kama, the record shows that the fact 
that the trial was delayed to spring 2001 was largely caused by the Prosecution’s inability to meet its 
disclosure obligations and lack of  readiness.  In light of  the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds that 
the Prosecution’s failure to fulfill its disclosure obligations created unjustified delays in the start of  the 
trial.108
As to delays caused by the judges’ participation in other trials, the Appeals Chamber held:
375.  It is unquestionable that the pace of  the trial was affected by the judges’ obligations in other cases. 
Whereas the proceedings in this case needed interruptions so as to allow the parties to prepare, the 
judges’ obligations in other cases prevented them from sitting in this case for approximately 36 weeks. 
In light of  the time required to dispose of  the motions filed in these other cases, deliberate on their 
merits, and write the judgements, these additional obligations also necessarily significantly reduced the 
time the Trial Chamber judges could devote to the present case.
376. The Appeals Chamber observes that it was practice for judges of  the Tribunal to participate 
simultaneously in multiple proceedings given the workload of  the Tribunal during the relevant 
period. It also notes that significant efforts were made by the authorities of  the Tribunal to obtain 
the necessary resources to complete its mandate while ensuring the utmost respect for the rights of  
all accused. However, in the particular circumstances of  this case where the co-Accused had already 
been in detention for nearly 4 to 6 years at the start of  the trial and which had already suffered from 
significant delays, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the additional delays resulting from the judges’ 
simultaneous participation to other proceedings caused undue delay.  The Appeals Chamber recalls that 
102 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment (30 September 2011), Annex A Procedural History, paras 5-7 (Short., J., 
dissenting).
103 See generally, Mugenzi v. Prosecutor, No. ICTR-99-50-A, Judgment (4 February 2013).
104 Mugenzi v. Prosecutor, No. ICTR-99-50-A, Judgment (4 February 2013), paras. 1-12 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
105 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, No. ICTR-98-42-A, Judgment (14 December 2015).
106 Two Government II defendants were acquitted by the Trial Chamber and the prosecutor did not appeal the acquittals.
107 And his sentence was reduced on appeal to 20 years.
108 Butare appeal judgment, para. 372.
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logistical considerations should not take priority over the trial chamber’s duty to safeguard the fairness 
of  the proceedings. In the same vein, the Appeals Chamber is of  the view that organisational hurdles 
and lack of  resources cannot reasonably justify the prolongation of  proceedings that had already been 
significantly delayed.109
The most important holding on right to trial without undue delay was the Appeals Chambers holding 
that unexplained lengthy detention alone can constitute prejudice for purposes of  Mugiraneza.  The Appeals 
Chamber held:
However, the Appeals Chamber recalls its finding that the present proceedings were unduly delayed as a 
result of  the Prosecution’s conduct and the Trial Chamber judges’ simultaneous assignment to multiple 
proceedings, delays which are not attributable to the co-Accused.  These delays prolonged the detention 
of  the co-Accused. The Appeals Chamber finds that these delays and the resulting prolonged detention 
constitute prejudice per se and that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the co-accused did not 
suffer prejudice.110
The Appeals Chamber granted the defendants relief  in the form of  sentence reductions.111 The Butare 
Appeals Chamber holding is similar to the holdings of  the Human Rights Committee and the ECHR in that 
unexplained delays can result in findings of  speedy trial violations while delays with reasonable explanations 
likely will not.  Also of  importance in the Butare appeals judgement is the recognition that lengthy pretrial 
delay standing alone can be prejudicial to the accused.
Of  importance to the analysis is the different positions taken by Judge Khan in Government II and Butare. 
In Government II, she did not join Judge Short in finding a violation of  the right due to the length of  the 
judgment drafting process caused by the assignment of  the judges to other cases.  However, in Butare, she 
found violations based on assignment of  judges to other cases during the trial.  This shows the slipperiness 
and lack of  solid analytical factors in the determination of  whether a defendant’s right to trial without undue 
delay has been violated.
The Appeals Chamber of  the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, the successor to the 
ICTY and ICTR, recently followed the Government II holding, finding that a 12-year period of  incarceration 
between arrest and trial judgment was not per se prejudicial.112
5.2. The International Criminal Court
The ICC apparently has not considered the application of  the right to trial without undue delay in detail 
as the ICTR Appeals Chamber did in Mugiraneza, Government II and Butare.  The discussions of  that right 
usually are in conjunction with other matters and the right is mentioned in passing.
For example, in Prosecutor v. Dyilo,113 a Trial Chamber cited the statutory provision,114 and discussed it in 
light of  the prosecutor’s duty to disclose information it obtained under a confidentiality agreement as well 
as the prosecutor’s duty to have the agreements lifted in a timely manner.115  On appeal of  that decision and 
related decisions, the Appeals Chamber again cited the right and stated the Trial Chamber equated the right 
to trial without undue delay with a fair trial.116  It held that a Trial Chamber could stay proceedings in order 
109 Butare appeal judgment, paras. 375-376.
110 Butare appeal judgment, para. 388.
111 See generally, Butare appeal judgment, paras. 3521-3538.
112 Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. MICT-16-99-A, Judgment (11 April 2018), para. 42 and n. 130.
113 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, N°. ICC-01/04-01/06, Public Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of  Disclosure and the Date of  
Trial (9 November 2007).
114 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, N°. ICC-01/04-01/06, Public Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of  Disclosure and the Date of  
Trial (9 November 2007), para. 1.
115 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, N°. ICC-01/04-01/06, Public Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of  Disclosure and the Date of  
Trial (9 November 2007), para. 19.
116 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of  the Prosecutor against the decision of  Trial 
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to obtain release of  information but,
[T]he right of  any accused person to be tried without undue delay (article 67 (1) (c) of  the Statute) demands that 
a conditional stay cannot be imposed indefinitely. A Chamber that has imposed a conditional stay must, from 
time to time, review its decision and determine whether a fair trial has become possible or whether, in particular 
because of  the time that has elapsed, a fair trial may have become permanently and incurably impossible. In the 
latter case, the Chamber may have to modify its decision and permanently stay the proceedings.117
However, the Appeals Chamber also held:
If  a trial that is fair in all respects becomes possible as a result of  changed circumstances, there would 
be no reason not to put on trial a person who is accused of  genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes - deeds which must not go unpunished and for which there should be no impunity (see 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of  the Preamble to the Statute).118
The Appeals Chamber’s decision in Dyilo makes it likely that the ICC will construe the right to trial 
without undue delay as a component of  the right to a fair trial.  The ICC likely will follow the lead of  the 
House of  Lords in Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of  2001) and allow trials to continue – and convictions 
stand – regardless of  delays as long as the underlying trial is considered fair.
6. reAson for lengthy delAys In InternAtIonAl trIAls
In this section, I discuss reasons why it takes so long to complete trials in international courts. The length 
of  time for trials runs from as short as 10 days in one ICTY case to multi-year marathons at both tribu-
nals.119 In examining the reasons for the length of  trials, primarily at the ICTY and ICTR, I will examine 
systemic delays caused by the structure of  the tribunals, delays caused by other internal United Nations 
problems, selection of  defendants and the complexity of  the litigation.
The ICC, which is a newer body, will be considered separately since it has completed only two cases 
through trial and appeal. In reviewing the reasons, I will rely on trial records such as judgments and motions, 
U.N. documents and my own experience as legal assistant and co-counsel at the two ad hoc tribunals. 
6.1. Structure of the tribunals: number of judges
The initial statute of  the ICTY was in a report to the Security Council by the Secretary General.120 It pro-
vided for 11 judges – two trial chambers with three judges each and an appeals chamber with five judges.121 
The Security Council later added a third trial chamber with three additional judges.122
Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of  non-disclosure of  exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agree-
ments and the application to stay the prosecution of  the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference 
on 10 June 2008” (21 October 2008) paras. 80-81.
117 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of  the Prosecutor against the decision of  Trial 
Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of  non-disclosure of  exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agree-
ments and the application to stay the prosecution of  the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference 
on 10 June 2008” (21 October 2008), para. 81.
118 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the appeal of  the Prosecutor against the decision of  Trial 
Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of  non-disclosure of  exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agree-
ments and the application to stay the prosecution of  the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference 
on 10 June 2008” (21 October 2008), para. 80.
119 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg took only 218 trial days.  The last two days were the reading in full of  the 
judgment and sentences.  The trial began with opening statements on November 20, 1945, and the final session – announcing sen-
tences was on October 1, 1946.  Twenty-one high-ranking government officials were tried in that case.
120 Statute of  the ICTY, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993) 
121 Statute of  the ICTY, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993). para. 73.
122 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1116 (1998)U.N. Doc. S/RES/1116 (1998). 
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The ICTR was created by the Security Council on November 8, 1994.123  The statute of  the ICTR established 
two trial chambers with three judges each and five judges on the appeals chamber.124  However, the ICTR appeals 
chamber was to be the ICTY appeals chamber,125 effectively making the five ICTY appeals chamber judges mem-
bers of  both tribunals.  The Security Council created a third ICTR trial chamber and added three judges in 2002.126
To further increase the number of  judges, the Security Council created pools of  ad litem judges, that is 
temporary judges who could be called to active service.  The ICTY was authorized a pool of  ad litem judges, 
up to nine could be in active service at any time.127  The same resolution created two additional ICTR judges 
to serve on the appeals chamber at the ICTY.  Thus, the appeals chamber for both tribunals consisted of  
seven judges – five from the ICTY and two from the ICTR – who sat in five-judge panels to hear appeals.
In 2002, the Security Council created a pool of  ad litem judges for the ICTR with up to nine on active 
service at any time.128 Essentially, the Security Council authorized up to 18 trial chamber judges at each tri-
bunal or six three-judge trial chambers.
As originally created, each of  the ad hoc tribunals effectively could try only two cases.  Later, each could 
try three cases.  The tribunals through creative scheduling could try more cases by, for example, trying one 
case in the morning and a second case in the afternoon or by scheduling trial sessions for multiple cases 
in which some trials were in session while others were adjourned.  Each tribunal used both techniques to 
increase the number of  trials being heard at a time.
However, the authorization of  ad litem judges did not immediately impact the ICTR’s ability to try cases. 
Although nine active ad litem judges were authorized, only five were initially assigned due to the lack of  per-
manent judges required on each trial chamber panel.  The U.N.’s board of  auditors in its review of  ICTR in 
2003 found that too many permanent judges already were engaged in lengthy trials to allow use of  the full 
complement of  ad litem judges.129
In the “best practices” manual published by the ICTY, it was estimated that using the ICTY system of  
split day trials with one trial in the morning and other in the afternoon, there would be 3.5 effective trial 
hours per day or 17.5 hours per week.130 Presumably, if  only a single trial was conducted in each courtroom, 
there would be 7 hours per day or 35 hours per week.
6.2. Structure of the tribunals: physical plant
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were temporary organizations housed in facilities not designed as cour-
thouses.  The ICTY was in building formerly housing the headquarters of  a Dutch insurance company and 
the ICTR was in a conference center/office complex, the Arusha International Conference Centre. 
The ICTY initially converted a lobby area into a large courtroom with a public gallery which could 
accommodate multi-defendant trials or appeals. It subsequently added a small courtroom designed for mo-
tions hearings but later used for single defendant trials.  That courtroom was not directly accessible to the 
public.  Spectators and defense teams had to be escorted by security personnel to the room. The ICTY 
eventually added a third, large courtroom with a public gallery suitable for multi-defendant trials.131
123 Statute of  the ICTR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/994 (1994)
124 Statute of  the ICTR, article 11.
125 Statute of  the ICTR, article 12(2).
126 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002)U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002). 
127 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000). U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000). 
128 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1512 (2003) 
129 U.N. Doc. A/59/5/Add. 11 (2004). U.N. Doc. A/59/5/Add. 11 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Audit Report], paras. 42-43.
130 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, 
2009. p. 73.
131 The author practiced in both of  the large ICTY courtrooms but was never in the smaller courtroom.
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The ICTR had a more difficult problem with courtrooms.  It initially created three courtrooms by kno-
cking out walls in the AICC office wings and turning them into long, narrow courtrooms with public gal-
leries.  All three were suitable for multi-defendant trials. It eventually converted space in the building to a 
fourth courtroom, albeit one without all of  the audio-visual equipment in the other three courtrooms.  T h e 
upshot was that an any given moment, the ICTY could conduct hearings in three cases and the ICTR in four.
6.3. Languages and translations
All three tribunals work in multiple languages.  For the ICTY, it was English, French and Bosnian Serbo-
-Croatian. For the ICTR, it was English, French and Kinyarwanda. This creates two separate reasons for 
lengthy proceedings. In trials and hearings, all testimony and argument had to be translated from the lan-
guage of  the speaker into the other two languages. This necessarily slows proceedings.  Estimating the delay 
from the number of  pages of  transcript, the ad hoc tribunals could take about half  to two-thirds as much 
testimony in an eight-hour day as a trial in the United States conducted in one language.
Document translation likewise was a significant cause of  delay. In each case, thousands of  documents 
had to be translated from the original language into French and English. Most often the originals were in 
the native language of  the defendants but at times, a document would be in one of  the tribunal’s working 
languages and it had to be translated into the other. This often was true for court documents. An example 
is the six-defendant Butare case.132
The first arrested defendant was taken into custody in 1995. The last was arrested in 1998.  The trial 
began June 12, 2001, and testimony ended December 2, 2008, after 714 trial days.133 The 1548-page trial 
chamber judgment was delivered in English only on July 14, 2011.134
Under the ICTR rules of  procedure and evidence, notice of  appeal listing grounds for appeal was due 
30 days later, August 14, 2011.135 Because one defense team worked in French, not English, the pre-appeal 
judge granted an extension of  time to file the notice of  appeal until 90 days after they were served with 
a French translation of  the judgment.136 When an English-speaking co-counsel was added to that defense 
team, the pre-appeal judge ordered the notice of  appeal filed by May 1, 2012, and it was in fact filed April 
26, 2012, almost two years after the Trial Chamber judgment was delivered.137 On July 2, 2011, the pre-
-appeal judge granted an extension of  time to file the defense appellate briefs until 60 days after service of  
the French trial judgment.138 The French translation of  the judgment was served on the parties February 1, 
2013, and the defendants’ appeal briefs were filed about two months later.139 Thus, the appellate process in 
the Butare case was delayed about 16 months simply due to translation the trial judgment.140
Translations of  documents in general also was a significant cause of  cost and delay. In January 2004, 
the U.N. Office of  Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)141 delivered a report to the General Assembly on 
document translation at the ICTY.   Of  importance to delays and costs was the OIOS finding that the ICTY 
prosecutor was paying non-certified translators, that is translators who had not passed the U.N. translator’s 
examination, $14 per page of  translation with an average of  12 pages per day compared to six pages per day 
132 See note 107, supra.
133 Butare case trial judgment, paras 6541 and 6597.
134 Butare case appeal judgment, Annex A, para. 2.
135 ICTR Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, Rule 108.
136 Butare case appeal judgment, Annex A, para. 3.
137 Butare case appeal judgment, Annex A, para. 6.
138 Butare case appeal judgment, Annex A, para. 11.
139 Butare case appeal judgment, Annex A, para. 14.
140 The appeal judgment is 1307 pages long and is dated December 14, 2015, just a few weeks short of  21 years after the first 
defendant taken into custody.
141 OIOS essentially is the inspector general for the United Nations.
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at $81 per page for translations by certified translators.142
At the ICTR, in 2003, it was standard practice for a translator to translate five pages of  300 words each 
per day.143 As of  April 2004, there was a backlog of  2,400 pages awaiting final translation.144
6.4. Complex litigation
By any standard, most trials before the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC are complex litigation.  They involve 
multi-count indictments, often multiple defendants and complex factual and legal questions, often including 
legal issues of  first impression.  This is especially true in multi-defendant trials. 
Multiple defendant trials add time and complexity for another reason.  Each witness is subject to cross 
examination by each party.  For example, in a four-defendant trial, each prosecution witness is subject to 
direct examination by the prosecutor and cross examination by each of  the four defendants.  At times, some 
or all of  the parties will either have no cross examination or limited cross examination but other witnesses 
may be subjected to detailed and lengthy cross examination.
Logistical problems such as transporting witnesses to either The Hague or Arusha, Tanzania, also com-
plicate the trials.  Witness transportation must be coordinated with trials and housing for the witnesses while 
they are at the tribunals.145
6.5. Bureaucratic infighting within the ICTR
A dispute developed between the ICTR registrar and the prosecutor over who had the authority to hire 
members of  the OTP staff.  Article 15(5) of  the ICTR Statute gives the prosecutor authority to select the 
OTP staff.  However, in May 2002, the U.N. secretary general gave hiring authority to the head of  office. 
The ICTR registrar took that to mean he had the authority to select and promote OTP staff.146  Although 
not mentioned in the OIOS report, the dispute between the prosecutor and registrar also effected hiring and 
promotions of  other members of  the OTP staff, including line prosecutors.
This bureaucratic infighting within the ICTR147 led to a delay of  more than a year in filing two of  the top 
jobs within the OTP, deputy prosecutor and chief  of  prosecutions.148  This occurred during a period in which 
the ICTR and ICTY had a single chief  prosecutor.  So, the deputy prosecutor at the ICTR was an especially 
important post because he was the person in charge of  the day-to-day operations of  the OTP in Arusha.
6.6. The ICC
The ICC has 18 judges,149 including five in the Appeals Division who cannot serve as trial or pre-trial jud-
ges.150  The remaining 15 are in three-judge trial chambers or pre-trial chambers.151  The court’s new perma-
nent headquarters has three courtrooms.  Given the relatively short time the court has been in existence 
142 U.N. Doc. A/58/667 (2004)U.N. Doc. A/58/667 (2004) [hereinafter OIOS report], para. 26.
143 2004 Audit Report, para. 77.
144 2004 Audit Report, para. 80.
145 The ICTY used commercial air to transport witnesses and staff  between the former Yugoslavia and The Netherlands.  The ICTR 
relied primarily on a chartered Beechcraft King Air which made two flights between Kigali, Rwanda, and Arusha, Tanzania, per week. 
ICTY witnesses were housed in hotels while ICTR witnesses generally were housed and fed in safe houses leased by the tribunal.
146 OIOS Report, para. 20.
147 And the prosecutor’s failure to understand general U.N. recruitment and personnel regulations.
148 OIOS Report, para. 22. 
149 Rome Statute, Article 36(1).
150 Rome Statute, Article 39(1) and 3(b).
151 Rome Statute, Article 39(2) (b).
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and the few cases tried through appeals, it is impossible to determine how long it likely will take to try cases 
before the ICC.
However, the ICC Rules of  Procedure and Evidence contain provisions likely to slow trials.  For exam-
ple, they have a preference for multi-defendant trials.152 There also are provisions for interlocutory appeals 
in the Statute and Rules, especially Article 82(1)(d), allowing interlocutory appeals of  a decision 
that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of  the proceedings 
or the outcome of  the trial, and for which, in the opinion of  the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate 
resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings.
7. remedIes for vIolAtIon of the rIght
As discussed, supra., several remedies have been used when violations of  the right to trial without undue 
delay are found.  They range from dismissal of  the charges to the simple satisfaction to a defendant that the 
violation has been noted by the authorities.  In this section of  this paper, I will discuss the strengths and 
limitations of  the various proposed remedies.
7.1. Dismissal
In Strunk, Chief  Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, held that dismissal is the only available 
remedy to cure a violation of  the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.  The Chief  Justice reasoned:
By definition, such denial [of  the right to speedy trial] is unlike some of  the other guarantees of  the 
Sixth Amendment. For example: failure to afford a public trial, an impartial jury, notice of  charges, or 
compulsory service can ordinarily be cured by providing those guaranteed rights in a new trial.  The 
speedy trial guarantee recognizes that a prolonged delay may subject the accused to an emotional stress 
that can be presumed to result in the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of  facing 
public trial or of  receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is presently serving – 
uncertainties that a prompt trial removes. 
It is true that Barker described dismissal of  an indictment for denial of  a speedy trial as an “unsatisfactorily 
severe remedy.” Indeed, in practice, “it means that a defendant who may be guilty of  a serious crime will 
go free, without having been tried.” 407 U.S., at 522. But such severe remedies are not unique in the 
application of  constitutional standards. 153
The Chief  Justice is correct that no remedy other than dismissal can truly remedy a denial of  a speedy 
trial.  While one deprived of  other trial rights can receive a remedy in the form of  a new trial, a new trial 
cannot turn back the calendar and remove the taint of  a denial of  speedy trial.
However, the harsh remedy makes judges reluctant to find a violation of  the right.  Instead, they can 
rely on the flexible standards set out in Barker to find no speedy trial violation.  The alternative is freeing a 
criminal, often one already convicted by a jury.  That was the result in Cardona.
On the other hand, remedies for other constitutional violations also can result in the release of  a de-
monstrably guilty man.  A person caught with a kilogram of  cocaine is equally guilty regardless of  whether 
he is convicted by a jury or freed because a judge suppressed the evidence due to a lack of  probable cause 
for the search.
152 ICC Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, Rule 136(1).
153 Strunk, 412 U.S., at 438-39. 
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7.2. Dismissal if the defendant cannot be tried fairly
The remedy adopted by the House of  Lords – try the defendant if  he can be tried fairly or dismiss the 
case – addresses some of  the prejudice experienced by a defendant due to unreasonable delays but not 
others.  So, for example, if  a key defense witness dies or is otherwise unable to testify, the case can be dis-
missed.  Juries can be instructed that due to delays not the fault of  the defendant, evidence has been lost 
or witnesses memories have faded and that should be taken into account in reaching a verdict. But it does 
nothing to cure the other prejudices recognized in Barker v. Wingo including the uncertainty of  the future, 
relations between the defendant and his family, loss of  job due to pretrial confinement or other reasons. 
While the UK approach is attractive, it does not eliminate the harm caused by unreasonable trial delays.
7.3. Reduction in sentence
Judge Short in his dissent in the Government II case suggested a sentence reduction as the appropriate 
remedy for violation of  the right to trial without undue delay.  This is an appropriate remedy for those 
eventually convicted of  a crime but it fails to take into account prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend 
himself.  Faded memories or missing evidence may result in a conviction when an acquittal might have been 
possible if  the trial had not been delayed unduly.
7.4. Cash payments
Judge Robinson in his dissent in the Government II appeal would have awarded two defendants acquitted 
of  all charges $5,000 each after being incarcerated almost 14 years.  That seems a small sum for such a long 
incarceration along with the mental stress of  facing charges including genocide and crimes against humanity.
The ECHR jurisprudence would give cash awards for monetary losses caused by the violation of  the 
right to trial without undue delay but the defendant must prove his losses.  And, these are direct losses and 
include nothing for loss of  freedom or mental anguish caused by the charges and delay in the trial.
7.5. Conclusion as to remedy
There is no perfect remedy for deprivation of  the right to a speedy trial.  The possible remedies either 
are so harsh – dismissal of  charges – that judges will be unlikely to find a violation of  the right and victims 
will feel betrayed by the system.  Focusing on the fairness of  the trial effectively makes the right to speedy 
trial a right without a remedy unless the prejudice is so severe that the defendant cannot get a fair trial.  Re-
duction of  sentence for a convicted person is an equitable remedy which takes some of  the harm out of  
the violation but which also fails to recognize the possibility that an acquittal would have been possible if  
the trial had been held expeditiously.  And, cash awards for those acquitted are likely to be inadequate and 
difficult to determine.
Giving an acquitted defendant a cash award also raises the issue of  other innocent defendants who were 
tried expeditiously.  Do they get compensation for their pretrial confinement?  If  not, do acquitted persons 
deprived of  the right to trial without undue delay receive compensation for the entire pretrial confinement 
or simply for the period of  undue delay?  And if  it is the latter, how is the period of  undue delay determi-
ned?
It seems likely that international courts enforcing the right to trial without undue delay will struggle with 
fashioning a remedy.  Given the gravity of  the crimes heard by international courts, it is unlikely that they 
will opt for dismissal except in the most extreme circumstances.  It is more likely that they will adopt some 
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combination of  the dissents from Judges Short and Robinson: reduction of  sentence if  convicted or cash 
payments if  acquitted.
8. suggestIons to speed trIAls
In 2009, the ICTY studied its procedures and wrote the ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY 
Manual).  Many of  the developed practices or best practices could shorten the length of  proceedings.  Some 
examples include:
8.1. Pretrial poceedings
Two of  the most important suggestions in the ICTY Manual are readiness for trial at the time an indict-
ment is presented and not “overloading” indictments.  As to preparation for trial, the ICTY recognized that 
ideally cases should be ready for trial when the indictment is presented but that is not always possible.  The 
manual states at 35:
Ideally a case should be ready for trial before an indictment is issued and it should be the object of  the 
Prosecutor’s investigation to gather all necessary evidence before any charges are brought. However, 
ICTY experience has shown that in large, complex war crime cases investigations will continue well 
beyond the stage at which sufficient material has been assembled to justify charging an accused. In 
practice it is not possible to have the final indictment ready at the very outset of  the case. Moreover, 
waiting until the investigation is “complete” may mean losing a unique opportunity to arrest the accused. 
The timing of  the decision to issue an indictment will therefore have to balance the need to arrest the 
accused with the desire for further investigation.
The ICTY also recognized the temptation of  prosecutors to load indictments with charges, often based 
on a single set of  facts, to ensure that all bases are covered by the indictment.  The manual urges caution in 
including numerous charges in an indictment.  It states:
One of  the most important lessons to be learned from the ICTY experience is that, given the complex 
nature of  war crime trials, there is a tendency for indictments to become overloaded with charges, thus 
making it difficult for the criminal process to cope with the extent of  issues to be proved. The problem 
becomes particularly acute in leadership cases or cases involving genocide and crimes against humanity, 
which inevitably involve massive prosecutorial undertakings. The criminal conduct of  an accused in such 
a case is likely to extend over a lengthy period of  time, and across broad geographical areas involving 
many individual victims and perpetrators. In leadership cases, it may be difficult to link commanders, 
especially political leaders, with individual incidents on the ground. In high-profile prosecutions, there 
may also be a desire to ensure that the charges properly reflect the full criminality of  the accused in a 
way that will adequately be recorded in history. These factors sometimes encourage prosecutors 
to bring indictments that are unwieldy to the point of  making trials unmanageable within a 
reasonable timeframe. It is, therefore, a good practice when drafting an indictment to estimate how 
long it is likely to take to try the case, bearing in mind the right of  the accused to an expeditious trial.154
The ICTY manual also recommends joint trials wherever possible.155  The manual states:
The decision to try a number of  accused together should be based upon policy and practical 
considerations. While there may be a clear preference for trying all those allegedly involved in a crime 
at the same time, so that judges can evaluate a transaction as a whole and can utilize resources more 
efficiently, practical issues may prevent joint trials. At the ICTY, for example, the number of  fugitives, 
and the fact that individual fugitives may be apprehended at different times, has sometimes made it 
154 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 36 (emphasis added).
155 The author disagrees that joint trials should be the norm.  Each case of  joinder should be decided on its own merits but 
joinder of  multiple defendants carries the risk of  lengthy trials.
CL
IN
E
, C
yn
th
ia
. T
ri
al
 w
it
h
o
ut
 u
n
du
e 
de
la
y:
 a
 p
ro
m
is
e 
un
fu
lfi
lle
d 
in
 in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 c
ri
m
in
al
 c
o
ur
ts
. R
ev
. B
ra
s.
 P
o
lít
. P
úb
lic
as
, B
ra
sí
lia
, v
. 8
, n
º 
1,
 2
01
8 
p.
54
-8
8
79
difficult to jointly prosecute all individuals accused of  one criminal transaction. However, the ICTY 
experience has shown that given the length and complexity of  a trial, joinder of  accused where possible 
is advisable. Separate trials can be difficult because they require additional resources, and create witness 
fatigue by requiring key witness to give what is essentially the same evidence on multiple occasions. This 
multiple testimony may create resentment on the part of  the witness and may result in contradictions 
between depositions provided at different times.156
The ICTY also developed a procedure in which the judges “suggested” that the prosecutor reduce the 
scope of  the indictment, either by dismissing counts or agreeing not to present evidence of  some crime 
sites.  The prosecutor often “declined” the suggestions.157 
8.2. Trial practices
8.2.1. Time limits on presentation of evidence
The ICTY trial judges often would set time limits for the presentation of  evidence by a side.  The manual 
gives this reasoning:
In light of  the voluminous materials presented, the period of  alleged criminal acts spanned in the 
indictments, and the inherent case management issues arising during the litigating of  international 
criminal matters, particularly in multi-accused cases, the presentation of  evidence could conceivably 
continue indefinitely.  Consequently, the imposition of  global time limits is viewed as a necessary and 
useful measure. The Tribunal’s general practice has been to set global time limits during the pre-trial 
phase of  the case, but after the parties have filed their witness and exhibit lists, which are generally 
required to be set forth in accordance with Rule 65ter (E) for the Prosecution and Rule 65ter (G) for the 
Defence. In relation to the Prosecution’s case, the establishment of  time limits may occur in the pre-trial 
phase, but generally happens only after the case has been assigned to a Trial Chamber for the trial phase. 
For the Defence, the establishment of  time limits occurs after the close of  the Prosecution’s evidence, 
and thus in the trial phase.158
While such time limits can force the parties to pare their cases and concentrate on what the party believes 
to be important evidence, arbitrary time limits can deprive a party of  the right to a fair trial.  Especially in 
multi-defendant trials, even a short direct examination of  a prosecution witness can lead to lengthy cross-
-examinations by the defendants.  An example is the examination of  a prosecution expert, Allison des 
Forges, in the Government II trial.  Her direct testimony took only 76 pages of  transcript including objections 
to admission of  some exhibits offered through her.159  Cross examination included about 18 pages of  trans-
cript that day and further cross examination lasted 12 full trial days.
If  time limits are set, they cannot be fairly used to limit cross examination nor can the time for cross exa-
mination be subtracted from the time of  the party presenting the witness.  Des Forges is a perfect example. 
The prosecution limited her testimony and presented most of  her evidence through her report and a book 
she had written and which was introduced into evidence.  It was short.  Yet, it opened the door to extensive 
cross examination.160
And, in multi-defendant trials, setting time limits for the defense or allotting time to each co-defendant 
can create substantial problems involving the rights of  each defendant.  The ICTY manual explains the 
procedure this way:
156 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 41.
157 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 66-67.
158 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 78.
159 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Tr. (31 May 2005), pages 3-79.
160 The Mugiraneza defense team, of  which the author was a part, cross examined des Forges forthreeand a half  days and intro-
duced 24 exhibits during the cross.
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It is important that the Trial Chamber not feel strictly bound to grant the Defence the same time as 
the Prosecution. In order to ensure a fair trial, the Chamber should carefully assess the amount of  
time the Defence requires to present its evidence. Additionally, the Chamber, in assigning time to each 
Defence team, must carefully consider the proposed evidence submitted in the exhibit and witness list 
submissions, and assign time for Defence evidence based upon the principles of  a fair and expeditious 
trial.161
8.2.2. Use of documentary evidence
Both the ICTR and ICTY adopted rules of  evidence allowing admission of  written statements under 
some circumstances, including if  the evidence is commutative, relates to historical background, relates to 
the impact of  the offenses on victims or the character of  the accused.162 The ICTY manual describes the 
advantages in this way:
The use of  written evidence may be a more efficient mode for presentation of  certain types of  evidence, 
particularly evidence dealing with factual portions of  a case, evidence relating to sites where crimes 
are alleged to have occurred (“crime based evidence”), and background historical, sociological, and 
statistical evidence. The admission of  written statements in lieu of  oral evidence, when used to prove a 
matter other than the accused’s acts and conduct, has enhanced the chambers’ ability to manage trials of  
a vast scale, and does not impinge fair-trial rights, provided that the statement declarant can be called for 
cross examination.  However, the use of  such statements has been complicated by lengthy statements, as 
well as by issues related to the evidential status of  documents referred to as sources in such statements 
(e.g., footnoted reports that the statement-maker’s conclusions are based on other information). Another 
disadvantage of  relying on written evidence is that the public may find it more difficult to follow the 
proceedings. However, this disadvantage is not sufficient to outweigh the advantages gained.163
The use of  Rule 92bis in both ad hoc tribunals shortened trials by relieving both parties of  the obligation 
to bring witnesses to present evidence such as additional alibi witnesses.  One or two live witness’ testimony 
could be supported by a series of  written statements, thereby shortening the procedure – and relieving the 
tribunal of  the cost of  transporting and housing the witness.
8.2.3. Guilty pleas
Guilty pleas obviously shorten the process.  When a defendant pleads guilty, there is no need for pre-
sentation of  witnesses. Additionally, it frees judicial and courtroom resources for other trials.  The plea 
bargaining process is well known in the United States, with most indictments resulting in guilty pleas rather 
than trials.  However, unless the trial judges imposing sentences are limited in the punishment they can im-
pose and unless defendants are properly represented in the plea negotiation process, one case can result in 
essentially the end to guilty pleas.  The ICTY recognized this in its manual:
Although some may refer to the guilty plea and plea agreement process as “plea bargaining”, this 
characterization is inaccurate for two reasons. First, a guilty plea may be entered without the benefit of  a 
plea agreement, and without regard to the Prosecutor’s views. Second, any agreement that is reached on 
the basis of  mutual negotiations is not binding on the Trial Chamber. In fact, the non-binding nature of  
plea agreements creates a disincentive to plead guilty and is probably the single largest reason that more 
guilty pleas do not occur, as an accused cannot be sure that the sentence or sentencing range negotiated 
with the Prosecutor and submitted by the Prosecutor to the Trial Chamber as appropriate will in fact 
be accepted by the Trial Chamber. In practice, it takes only one instance wherein a Trial Chamber 
significantly exceeds the recommended sentencing range for other accused, to disregard the prospective 
161 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 99 (internal footnote omitted).
162 ICTR Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, Rule 92bis, ICTY Rules of  Procedure and Evidence,Rule92bis.
163 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 80.
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benefits of  pleading guilty pursuant to plea agreements.164
An example is the case of  Jean Kambanda, the former prime minister of  Rwanda, who was the first 
person to plead guilty at the ICTR.  He was sentenced to life in prison165 and that sentence was affirmed 
on appeal.166 That sentence was a disincentive for any other defendant to plead guilty.  In discussions with 
ICTR accused, the author was told there was no reason to plead guilty if  they are going to get life in any case.
8.3. Conclusion on shortening trials
The ICTY manual is correct in criticizing the prosecution for overloading indictments and being unready 
for trial at the time indictments are issued.  Further, there commonly were delays in disclosure which slowed 
both the pretrial and trial process.  These delays can be laid at the feet of  the prosecution.
While the tribunals have a preference for multi-defendant trials, these can contribute to lengthy trials. 
By their very nature, much of  the prosecution case and much of  each defendant’s case likely is irrelevant to 
other defendants yet they are forced to sit through lengthy proceedings contributing to unreasonable delays.
Single defendant trials or multi-defendant trials involving only the same offenses would speed the trials 
considerably.  This would to a great extent eliminate the problem of  presentation of  evidence irrelevant to 
some defendants in multi-defendant trials.
The ad hoc tribunals never sanctioned the prosecution for failure to disclose evidence, including exculpa-
tory evidence.  Assessing meaningful sanctions such as exclusion of  evidence, dismissal of  charges or even 
money sanctions against individual prosecutors could be an incentive to produce documents in a timely 
manner, thereby reducing delays.
It is more difficult to eliminate delays in the defense cases.  Even if  the prosecution is trial ready the day 
the indictment is presented, the defense requires time to prepare for trial.  Given the number of  counts and 
accusations in an indictment and the necessity to conduct investigations in locations far from the offices and 
homes of  defense counsel and staff, it takes considerable time for the defense to investigate the case and to 
prepare for trial.167  Early and complete disclosure of  information and specific allegations by the prosecutor 
could shorten the time for pretrial preparation by the defense.
The attached charts prepared by the two ad hoc tribunals for the Security Council show that the length 
of  trials varied greatly from a relatively short time to multi-year marathons.  This leads to the question of  
selection of  defendants.
International courts can never try all persons accused of  crimes during armed conflicts.  There simply are 
too many possible defendants.  Most of  the defendants will have to be tried in national courts.  The inter-
national courts should be reserved for the most important defendants, such as military and political leaders.
The ICTR generally limited its indictments to Hutu military and political leaders or community leaders 
such as clergy who took part in crimes.168  The ICTY on the other hand indicted and tried numerous de-
fendants who can best be described as small fry such as Esad Landzo in the Celebici case.  Concentrating on 
high-ranking or influential defendants would free resources and shorten the length of  delays between arrest 
and disposition of  the cases.
164 ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (ICTY Manual), 69-70.
165 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment (4 September 1998).
166 Kambanda v. Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment (19 October 2000).
167 In the Government II case, the defense team of  which the author was a member interviewed witnesses in Canada, Finland, 
Switzerland and Italy as well as Rwanda.
168 The ICTR has been criticized for its failure to indict any Tutsis even though there was evidence that the Tutsi rebels commit-
ted war crimes.  See e.g., Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing its Doors (December 23, 2015), <https://www.
hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closing-its-doors>.
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Finally, international courts must have the resources in terms of  judges and courtrooms to try those 
cases expeditiously.  Eighteen judges – only 13 of  whom can try cases – and three courtrooms at the ICC 
will be insufficient if  large numbers of  defendants are indicted and arrested.
International courts are costly.  The two ad hoc tribunals at their peaks had hundreds of  employees ran-
ging from secretaries to judges and lawyers.  If  the international community does not provide the resources, 
it will be impossible to expeditiously dispose of  these complex cases. At the same time, leaders who engage 
in criminal activity be it in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Syria or Sudan should be held liable for their 
crimes.  It is important that leaders know they will face criminal sanctions for violations of  international law.
However, the trials must not only be fair, they must be seen to be fair.  The International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg is an example of  how a trial can be both expeditious, fair and previewed as being fair. 
The IMT trial of  the major war criminals involved 24 high-ranking defendants.  It began on November 20, 
1945, and the verdicts were delivered on October 1, 1946, the 218th trial day.169
 Just as determining whether a person is deprived of  his right to a speedy trial is “slippery,” the pro-
per remedy also is slippery.  International courts trying the most serious cases such as the ICTY, ICTR and 
now the ICC, must organize themselves in such a way that they can try defendants promptly and without 
undue delays.  Lengthy delays do nothing but deprive the courts of  legitimacy. Both the defendants and the 
victims deserve speedy resolutions of  the cases.
Table A - Cases from the ICTR
Case 
No. 
Name Former title Initial appea-
rance 
Judgements of  the Tribunal: genocide (Sta-
tute of  the Tribunal, para. 2 (3) a-e); crimes 
against humanity (Statute, para. 3 a-i); vio-
lations of  article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of  Additional Protocol II 
(Geneva) (Statute, para. 4 a-h). 
Appeals Chamber disposition (bold text) 
Trial judgement 
date 
Appeal judge-
ment date (bold 
text) 
1 J.-P. Akayesu Bourgmestre of  
Taba 
30 May 1996 Genocide (genocide, direct and public inci-
tement to commit genocide), crimes against 
humanity (all counts) 
2 September 1998 
Sentence of  life imprisonment affir-
med on appeal 
1 June 2001 
2 J. Kambanda Prime Minister 1 May 1998 Genocide (genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, complicity in genocide), 
crimes against humanity (murder, extermi-
nation) 
4 September 1998 
(guilty plea) 
Sentence of  life imprisonment, appe-
al dismissed 
19 October 2000 
3 O. Serushago Businessman, 
Interahamwe 
leader 
14 December 
1998 
Genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, 
extermination, torture) 
5 February 1999 
(guilty plea) 
Sentence of  15 years of  impri-
sonment affirmed 
14 February 2000 
169 For anyone interested, the complete IMT record is available on line at <http://www.loc. gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_ma-
jor-war-criminals.html>.  It includes *.pdf  copies of  all 42 volumes of  the trial record including transcripts of  proceedings and 
exhibits.
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Case 
No. 
Name Former title Initial appea-
rance 
Judgements of  the Tribunal: genocide (Sta-
tute of  the Tribunal, para. 2 (3) a-e); crimes 
against humanity (Statute, para. 3 a-i); vio-
lations of  article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of  Additional Protocol II 
(Geneva) (Statute, para. 4 a-h). 
Appeals Chamber disposition (bold text) 
Trial judgement 
date 
Appeal judge-
ment date (bold 
text) 
4 C. Kayishema Préfet of  Ki-
buye 
31 May 1996 Genocide 21 May 1999 (join-
der) 
Sentence of  life imprisonment affirmed 
O. Ruzindana Businessman 29 October 
1996 
Genocide 1 June 2001 
Sentence of  25 years of  imprisonment affirmed 
Fonte: Copied Verbatim from the Tribunal’s Final Report to the Security Council
Table B - Cases from the ICTR
1 Trial Judgments
Case number Case name Date Date of  initial appearance Number 
of  accused 
Number 
of  
pagesa 
IT-94-1-T Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić 7 May 1997 26 April 1995 1 304 
IT-96-21-T Prosecutor v. Hazim Delić, 
Zdravko Mucić, Zejnil Delalić 
and Esad Landžo 
or 
Mucić et al. (Čelebići case) 
16 Novem-
ber 1998 
11 April 1996 Zdravko Mucić 
9 May 1996 Zejnil Delalić 
18 June 1996 Hazim Delić and 
Esad Landžo 
4 487 
IT-95-17/1-T Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija 10 December 
1998 
19 December 1997 1 122 
IT-95-14/1-T Prosecutor v. Zlatko 
Aleksovski 
25 June 1999 29 April 1997 1 93 
IT-95-10-T Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić 14 December 
1999 
26 January 1998 1 46 
IT-95-16-T Prosecutor v. Zoran 
Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, 
Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago 
Josipović, Dragan Papić and 
Vladimir Šantić 
or 
Kupreškić et al. 
14 January 
2000 
8 October 1997 Zoran Kupreškić, 
Mirjan Kupreškić, Drago 
Josipović, Dragan Papić and Vla-
dimir Šantić 
16 January 1998 Vlatko Kupreškić 
6 349 
IT-95-14-T Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić 3 March 
2000 
3 April 1996 1 290 
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Case number Case name Date Date of  initial appearance Number 
of  accused 
Number 
of  
pagesa 
IT-96-23-T Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kuna-
rac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran 
Vuković 
or 
Kunarac et al. 
22 February 
2001 
9 March 1998 Dragoljub Kunarac 
4 August 1999 Radomir Kovač 
29 December 1999 Zoran Vuković 
3 323 
IT-95-14/2-T Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić 
and Mario Čerkez 
26 February 
2001 
8 October 1997 2 370 
IT-98-33-T Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić 2 August 
2001 
7 December 1998 1 260 
IT-98-30/1-T Prosecutor v. Miroslav 
Kvočka, Milojica Kos, Mlađo 
Radić, Zoran Žigić and Dra-
goljub Prcać 
or 
Kvočka et al. 
2 November 
2001 
16 December 1998 Miroslav 
Kvočka, Mlađo Radić, Milojica 
Kos and Zoran Žigić 
10 March 2000 Dragoljub Prcać 
5 245 
IT-97-25-T Prosecutor v. Milorad Kr-
nojelac 
15 March 
2002 
18 June 1998 1 237 
IT-98-32-T Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević 29 Novem-
ber 2002 
28 January 2000 1 122 
IT-98-34-T Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić 
and Vinko Martinović 
31 March 
2003 
12 August 1999 Vinko Martinović 
24 March 2000 Mladen Naletilić 
2 296 
IT-97-24-T Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić 31 July 2003 28 March 2001 1 290 
IT-95-9-T Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, 
Miroslav Tadić and Simo Zarić 
or 
Simić et al. 
17 October 
2003 
17 February 1998 Miroslav Tadić 
25 February 1998 Simo Zarić 
15 March 2001 Blagoje Simić 
3 370 
2 Appeals Chamber Judgments
Case number Case name Date Number of  accused Number of  pages 
IT-96-22-A Prosecutor v. Dražen 
Erdemović 
7 October 1997 1 18 
IT-94-1-A Prosecutor v. Duško 
Tadić 
15 July 1999 1 177 
IT-95-14/1-A Prosecutor v. Zlatko 
Aleksovski 
24 March 2000 1 87 
IT-95-17/1-A Prosecutor v. Anto 
Furundžija 
21 July 2000 1 106 
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IT-96-21-A Prosecutor v. Zejnil 
Delalić, Zdravko 
Mucić, Hazim Delić 
and Esad Landžo 
or 
Mucić et al. (Čelebići 
case) 
20 February 2001 4 364 
IT-95-10-A Prosecutor v. Goran 
Jelisić 
5 July 2001 1 77 
IT-95-16-A Prosecutor v. Zoran 
Kupreškić, Mirjan 
Kupreškić, Vlatko 
Kupreškić, Drago 
Josipović and Vladi-
mir Šantić 
or 
Kupreškić et al. 
23 October 2001 5 209 
IT-96-23 and IT-
96-23-A/1 
Prosecutor v. Dra-
goljub Kunarac, 
Radomir Kovač and 
Zoran Vuković 
or 
Kunarac et al. 
12 June 2002 3 144 
IT-97-25-A Prosecutor v. Milorad 
Krnojelac 
17 September 2003 1 135 
IT-98-32-A Prosecutor v. Mitar 
Vasiljević 
25 February 2004 1 91 
IT-98-33-A Prosecutor v. Radi-
slav Krstić 
19 April 2004 1 136 
IT-95-14-A Prosecutor v. Tiho-
mir Blaškić 
29 July 2004 1 301 
IT-95-14/2-A Prosecutor v. Dario 
Kordić and Mario 
Čerkez 
17 December 2004 2 328 
IT-98-30/1-A Prosecutor v. Miro-
slav Kvočka, Mlađo 
Radić, Zoran Žigić 
and Dragoljub Prcać 
or 
Kvočka et al. 
28 February 2005 4 303 
IT-97-24-A Prosecutor v. Milomir 
Stakić 
22 March 2006 1 195 
IT-98-34-A Prosecutor v. Mladen 
Naletilić and Vinko 
Martinović 
3 May 2006 2 250 
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IT-95-9-A Prosecutor v. Blagoje 
Simić 
(formerly Simić et al.) 
28 November 2006 1 158 
IT-98-29-A Prosecutor v. Stani-
slav Galić 
30 November 2006 1 247 
IT-99-36-A Prosecutor v. Rado-
slav Brđanin 
3 April 2007 1 201 
IT-02-60-A Prosecutor v. Vidoje 
Blagojević and Dra-
gan Jokić 
9 May 2007 2 165 
IT-03-66-A Prosecutor v. Fatmir 
Limaj, Haradin Bala 
and Isak Musliu 
or 
Limaj et al. 
27 September 2007 3 136 
IT-01-48-A Prosecutor v. Sefer 
Halilović 
16 October 2007 1 116 
IT-01-47-A Prosecutor v. Enver 
Hadžihasanović and 
Amir Kubura 
22 April 2008 2 153 
IT-03-68-A Prosecutor v. Naser 
Orić 
3 July 2008 1 108 
IT-01-42-A Prosecutor v. Pavle 
Strugar 
17 July 2008 1 190 
IT-95-11-A Prosecutor v. Milan 
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